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OPTIMAL PRICING AND ENDOGENOUS HERDING
Abstract
We consider a monopolist who sells identical objects of common but
unknown value in a herding-prone environment. Buyers make their
purchasing decisions sequentially, and rely on a private signal as well as
previous buyers’ actions to infer the common value of the object. The model
applies to a variety of cases, such as the introduction of a new product or the
sale of licenses to use a patent. We characterize the monopolist’s optimal
pricing strategy and its implications for the temporal pattern of prices and for
herding. The analysis is performed under alternative assumptions about
observability of prices. We find that when previous prices are observable,
herding may but need not arise. In contrast, herding arises immediately when
previous prices are unobservable and the seller’s equilibrium strategy is a
pure Markov strategy. While the possibility of social learning is present in the
first case, it is absent in the second. Finally, we examine the seller’s
incentive to manipulate the buyers’ evaluation of the object when buyers are
naive. Using secret discounts the seller successfully interferes with social
learning, and herding occurs in finite time.
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